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COMPARED TO SOME OF ITS EAST ASIAN NEIGHBORS, SUCH AS SOUTH
Korea and Japan, Taiwan’s party system has been much more stable
over the last two decades. Remarkably, the same two parties, the
Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), domi-
nate the party scene in 2012 as in 1986. The year 1986 was particu-
larly significant as it was the first election in which the KMT faced a
genuine opposition party.1 Taiwan has not seen the kind of confusing
wholesale party splits and mergers that characterized Korean and
Japanese party politics for much of the 1990s and 2000s. Neverthe-
less, there have been periods where new Taiwanese parties emerged
to challenge the mainstream parties and also times when politicians
from the splinter parties moved back to the established parties. These
patterns of party switching contributed to the country’s fluctuations
between dominant, multiparty, and two-party systems. 
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Patterns of party switching in Taiwan have played an important role in
the development and relative stability of its party system. In this study I
aim to track key patterns of how politicians switched their partisan affili-
ation during the critical periods of party system change. I examine the
level of party switching, where party switching was most prevalent, when
switching was most common, and the most common types of switching
since the advent of multiparty politics in Taiwan. Party switching is an im-
portant phenomenon in the development of party politics in Taiwan but
thus far it has received surprisingly little systematic attention. This is the
first comprehensive attempt to tackle this understudied topic. KEYWORDS:
Taiwan, party switching, political parties, party systems
Conventional wisdom suggests that party switching is not com-
mon and is largely restricted to newer democracies. However, recent
studies show that the practice is far more common than expected and
also features frequently in mature Western European democracies
(Heller and Mershon 2005). Given the far-reaching potential conse-
quences of party switching, it is perhaps surprising that it has not re-
ceived greater attention in either the comparative party politics liter-
ature or studies focused on new democracies such as Taiwan. In a
recent edited volume William Heller and Carol Mershon (2009, 4)
note, “Despite its manifestation across countries and continents,
party switching remains an understudied phenomenon. That is not to
say that students of legislative and party politics have neglected it en-
tirely, but rather that they have underestimated the breadth and depth
of its significance.” 
In the Taiwan case, where the issue has received attention it has
tended not to be the focal point of the research. For instance, Hsu
Yung-ming (2006) has looked at party splits and mergers to explain
Taiwan’s changing party system, while I (Fell 2013) have argued that
party switching can be viewed as a consequence of changing nomina-
tion practices. The scholar that has given the most attention to party
switching (at least in English publications) has been Mikael Mattlin
(2006, 2011). His studies have attempted to track and explain party
switching at both the national parliamentary and grassroots level
elections before and after 2000. Therefore his research only focused
on a limited number of elections before and after the first change of
ruling parties. 
Existing studies of party switching tend to look at the topic
through a number of angles. A first challenge is how to define and
measure patterns of party switching. Thus these kinds of studies
consider what constitutes party switching, potential typologies, and
the resources and standards for measuring the process (Heller and
Mershon 2009, 8–10). A second challenge is how best to explain
why politicians switch. Are they principally motivated by their own
personal ambition for reelection, potential office perks, or their rela-
tionship with the party leadership? Another possibility is that their
main driving force is ideological. In other words, politicians might
be switching as a result of dissatisfaction with changed policy posi-
tions of their original party and the attractions of more desirable po-
sitions held by alternative parties. A classic instance of such a devel-
opment occurred with the creation of the British Social Democratic
Party by Labour politicians uncomfortable with their party’s swing
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to the hard left in the early 1980s. Thus the party-switching litera-
ture is able to engage with the political science debate over whether
politicians are mainly motivated by considerations of votes, office,
or policy (Müller and Strøm 1999). As important as why politicians
switch is the question of why most politicians do not switch even
when they are highly dissatisfied with their party and there are alter-
native parties in the party system. The third and perhaps most im-
portant consideration of this topic are the consequences of party
switching. Here much of the focus has been on the impact of party
switching on the legislative party system, particularly patterns of
fragmentation. However, this switching can also have a significant
impact on both party and government policy positions, at least if the
scale of switching is sufficient. We observed this in the 1990s in Tai-
wan when the departure of KMT politicians to form the New Party
(NP) reduced resistance against Lee Teng-hui’s attempts to reshape
KMT and national government policies regarding national identity
and China (Fell 2005a). Another dimension of the consequences
theme is the impact of switching on politicians’ subsequent electoral
performance. For instance, Grose and Yoshinaka (2003) have found
switching has had a negative effect on post-defection vote shares in
the United States. 
In this study I focus mainly on the first and third dimensions. I
aim to track key patterns of how politicians switched their partisan
affiliation during the critical periods of party system change. Key
questions to be addressed include the following: (1) How common
has party switching been? (2) Where has party switching been most
intensive? (3) When has party switching been most common and
have there been clear trends over time? (4) What have been the most
common patterns of party switching—from party to party or between
parties and independents? By pursuing these questions I hope to pro-
vide the first comprehensive examination of patterns of party switch-
ing in Taiwan. 
I also reveal the significant consequences of party switching on
Taiwan’s party system. Unlike in South Korea and Japan, the lack of
switching across ideological party lines has contributed to the rela-
tive stability of the Taiwanese party system. Party switching has af-
fected the relative electoral fortunes of the major parties. In contrast
to the loyalty of DPP politicians, high levels of defections away from
the KMT served to undermine the party’s electoral results for much
of the period covered in this research. However, defections back to
the KMT after 2004 contributed to its return to power in 2008. 
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Measurement of Party Switching
The first task before answering these important questions is to deter-
mine what constitutes party switching for this study. Heller and Mer-
shon (2009, 8–10) suggest two types of party switching according to
direction, which are inswitches and outswitches. In the former case a
politician adopts a formal party label after having another label,
while an outswitch sees the abandonment of a party label without
necessarily taking a new one. The outswitch is important in the Tai-
wanese case as it is quite common for party politicians to stand as in-
dependents or party rebels after failing to get official nomination.
Often the party center will expel a politician for standing without en-
dorsement, though in some cases they will later be allowed back. The
line between party nomination and a rebel candidate is not always
clear-cut, especially in the democratic transition period. Therefore
the standard that I have taken is as follows: If the candidate is listed
as an independent (usually KMT rebel or not nominated) they are
taken as independents. However, where they are listed as KMT open
nomination (i.e., they are allowed to run without formal nomination),
they are taken as being officially nominated.2
In this article I use 1986 as the starting point, as it was the first
election in which the KMT faced a genuine opposition party. Al-
though the Tangwai can be regarded as the forerunner of the DPP,
under martial law opposition parties were still banned as Taiwan was
in effect a one-party state.3
Another way scholars have distinguished between types of party
switching is by its impact on the number of parties. Thus, for exam-
ple, Heller and Mershon (2009, 8–10) distinguish among (1) switch-
ing across existing parties, without change in the number of relevant
parties; (2) fission, whereby an existing party splits into two or more
new parties; (3) fusion, whereby two or more existing parties merge
to create a new one; and (4) start-up, where party switches create a
new party. At least in the Taiwan case we clearly have cases of
switching across existing parties and start-ups. In addition there are a
number of variants on the fusion type whereby a smaller party
merges into an existing mainstream party. A case in point was when
the Chinese Social Democratic Party (SDP) merged into the NP in
1993 but without the creation of a new party title. 
In Taiwan there are a vast number of elected positions, from the
national level down to the grassroots level of neighborhood or village
chief; therefore I have had to be selective in my election level cover-
age. I focused on the career records of all politicians who stood for a
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relevant party in national-level elections.4 I take national-level elec-
tions as incorporating the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly,
and the presidency, and I also included data for city mayors, county
magistrates, and the Provincial Assembly. I decided to be quite inclu-
sive in terms of which relevant parties to examine; thus I examined
data for all parties that nominated significant numbers of candidates
over more than one election and had at least a minimum number of
serious candidates (see Fell 2005b). 
The main source I have used to locate politicians’ party affilia-
tion has been the listing on the Central Election Commission (CEC)
online database for elections between 1993 and 2012. For the elec-
tions from 1986 to 1992 I made use of the newspaper election regis-
tration and result reports, mainly using the United Daily News
(UDN) database. Two national-level elections that are not included in
the CEC database are the final two National Assembly elections of
2000 and 2005. Including 2000 may seem controversial as the elec-
tion was eventually aborted; however, party affiliation during this
contest is an important window into trends in party switching at the
outset of the DPP era (2000–2008). I relied on newspaper reports for
the aborted 2000 National Assembly contest and the National Assem-
bly’s own database for 2005. Although I have only examined cases of
politicians who have contested national-level elections, I also have
taken into account the fact that Taiwanese politicians move both up
and down the political ladder during their careers. Therefore I have
also used candidate affiliation listing for other election types such as
city or county council. In other words, where a politician has stood
for a relevant party in a national-level election, I also tracked their
career if they also stood at other lower levels. This means that I have
a total of twenty separate elections over twenty-six years with which
to locate party affiliation.5 This method is slightly different from that
employed by most studies of party switching, which tend to just
focus on one level of office, especially legislators who switched af-
filiation over a legislative term (Mattlin 2011, 101–128). However,
my approach is more sensitive to changed affiliations since more
cases can be picked up as politicians move up and down the political
ladder. 
The politicians examined in this study are first summarized in
Table 1, which shows the number of politicians whose careers have
been tracked is 1,984. These are then broken down according to their
party affiliation. Those in the KMT and DPP categories are politi-
cians who stood for these parties in their first elections, respectively.
Those categorized as Blue stood first for one of the following KMT
splinter parties: People First Party (PFP) or NP.6 Those categorized
as Green first stood for one of the following parties: Taiwan Inde-
pendence Party (TIP), New Nation Alliance (NNA), or Taiwan Soli-
darity Union (TSU). Those categorized as Third first stood for other
parties, such as the SDP, Labor Party (LP), or Green Party (GP). A
first lesson here is that the number of KMT politicians contesting
elections is far larger than that of their major rival the DPP. If we
also factor in the politicians standing for the KMT and its splinter
parties, then there is a ratio of approximately two candidates to one
for the DPP and its splinter parties. It also shows the scarcity of
politicians standing for election from alternative ideology parties, by
which I mean parties not centered on Taiwan’s national identity or
Green versus Blue divisions. This does reflect the limits to political
choice available to Taiwanese voters. 
Next, Table 2 gives us a picture of the number of actual cases
where party affiliation could be located for these 1,984 politicians.
My dataset has captured a total of 5,177 cases. The example of Weng
Chung-yun, the KMT politician from Chiayi County, can illustrate
how the cases are calculated. During the period covered he stood for
election for the KMT eight times, thus generated eight cases in which
his affiliation could be located. We can see that the gap between
KMT and DPP cases is actually narrower than that of politicians ex-
amined. This suggests that DPP politicians are more likely to have
stood for multiple elections than their KMT counterparts. 
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Table 1  Politicians Representing Major Parties and Total Number 
of Politicians Who Switched at Least Once, 1986–2012
Proportion (in %)
Total Politicians Who of Politicians 
Total Politicians Switched Parties Switching 
Party Tracked at Least Once Affiliations 
KMT 1,014 343 33.83
DPP 612 143 23.37
Blue 195 76 38.97
Green 61 28 45.90
Third 102 23 22.55
Total 1,984 613 30.90
Trends in Party Switching
We can now begin to plot patterns of party switching between 1986
and 2012. The broad results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 showing
the total numbers of switches and the proportion of switching cases.
I located a total of 852 party switches over the period. This means
that the overall probability of a politician switching is 0.16. In other
words, politicians switched partisan labels on approximately 16 per-
cent of cases. Of course it is possible that these figures are slightly
distorted due to certain politicians frequently switching party labels.
Therefore I checked the number of politicians who switched at least
once. Table 1 shows that almost 31 percent of politicians have
changed affiliations at least once in their careers. 
The next question is, who is more likely to shift party labels?
Both Tables 1 and 2 reveal that party affiliation matters in switching.
KMT politicians are far more likely to switch affiliation than their
DPP counterparts. For instance, almost 34 percent of KMT politi-
cians have changed affiliations at least once compared to 23 percent
of DPP politicians. The KMT politicians switched in 18 percent of
cases, compared to only 10 percent for the DPP. Therefore on almost
a fifth of cases KMT politicians have switched party labels. How-
ever, politicians in the splinter parties showed the highest levels of
party switching, with almost half of those in the Green category
switching at least once. This gives us a picture of contrasting levels
of party discipline, or perhaps loyalty, with the DPP showing by far
the lowest level of defections.
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Table 2  Total Number of Cases and Cases of Switched Affiliation, 
1986–2012 
Proportion 
of Switches 
Party Casesa Switches (in %)
KMT 2,616 475 18.16
DPP 1,775 190 10.70
Blue 479 115 24.01
Green 138 40 28.99
Third 169 32 18.93
Total 5,177 852 16.46
Note: a. The second column shows the total number of cases where politicians’ affiliations
could be located. 
I wanted to see whether there is significant variation in geo-
graphical districts with a dataset that covers all of Taiwan. The
largest metropolitan districts have moderate levels of switching, with
Taipei City (15.5 percent of cases featuring switches) slightly below
average and Kaohsiung (18 percent) above average. Kinmen and
Lienchiang have by far the highest proportion of party switching at
31 percent of cases compared to the lowest in Yilan with under 10
percent.7 There does not seem to be a clear urban-rural difference in
party switching. However, there are a few interesting patterns. If we
examine the five districts with the highest levels of switching, it is
clear that four of these cases have been highly dominated by the
KMT and its allies, with almost no space for the DPP. The common
feature of the locations with the lowest levels of switching is that
they have mainly two-party competition and have thus had limited
space for either splinters or independents. 
The next question to consider is whether there is significant vari-
ation in when politicians have been most active in switching. Thus I
have listed the top fifteen years for the numbers of party-switching
cases in Table 3. It reveals that elections immediately following the
party turnovers have featured the highest levels of party defections,
such as 2001, 2002, 2000, 2008, and 2009. The year 2001 particu-
larly stands out with 123 switches and 28 percent of cases that year
featuring switches in affiliation. Although there is significant varia-
tion in annual levels of switching, Table 3 reveals that party switch-
ing has been a consistent phenomenon since the advent of multiparty
politics in the late 1980s. 
It is also worth examining whether there are particular periods
when party switching was especially common. Time-series compari-
son can give a clearer picture of trends over time than looking at in-
dividual elections. Table 4 shows the numbers of party switches over
eight legislative terms from 1986 to 2012. It also suggests that party
switching has been a constant feature of Taiwanese party politics re-
gardless of era. Although the fifth term (1998–2001) has the highest
level of party switching, the clear distinction is before and after
1998. In the first period from 1986 to 1998 party defections stood at
approximately 13 percent of cases. However, in the post-2000 period
the proportion of switching cases has tended to be approximately 22
percent. One surprising finding is that even after Taiwan’s smaller
parties collapsed in the advent of the new electoral system in 2008,
the level of party switching has remained high in the most recent
term (2008–2012).8
38 Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Table 4 also raises the possibility of comparing Taiwan’s level of
party switching with those of other countries. In countries such as
Britain, Germany, the United States, or Germany less than 1 percent
of legislators shift labels during a single term. However, Taiwan’s
levels of party switching are generally lower than those experienced
in new democracies such as Brazil, Ukraine, or Russia, where inci-
dences of switching tended to be over 30 percent. Even the supposed
mature democracy of Italy has higher levels of legislative switching
than Taiwan in its four parliamentary terms between 1988 and 2000
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Table 3  Top Fifteen Years for Numbers of Politicians Switching Party 
Labels, 1986–2012
Rank Year Number of Politicians Who Switched Party Labels
1 2001 123
2 1998 103
3 2002 78
4 1989 66
5 2000 55
6 2008 53
7 2004 50
8 1992 45
9 2009 41
10 2005 38
11 1995 34
12 2012 34
13 1996 22
14 1994 21
15 2010 19
Table 4  Party Switching over Eight Legislative Terms  
Term Period Switches Ratio (in %)
1 1986–1989 73 13.20
2 1989–1992 58 9.22
3 1992–1995 72 14.23
4 1995–1998 142 13.26
5 1998–2001 179 22.26
6 2001–2004 129 22.13
7 2004–2008 104 17.96
8 2008–2012 95 21.16
(Heller and Mershon 2009, 11).9 In a cross-national collection of data
on party switching, the case coming closest to Taiwan is actually the
European Parliament with 16 percent of members of the European
Parliament switching between 1989 and 1994. 
We now have an idea of the years and political eras in which
switching was most common. But what about the types of party
switching? Who is moving and in what directions? In order to get a
picture of this I have listed the most common forms of party switch-
ing in Table 5. The first thing apparent here is that the most common
type of switching is what Heller and Mershon call outswitching from
parties, or in other words, candidates from the major parties standing
as independents or unnominated party rebels. However, such
switches are far more common for the Blue parties, with by far the
largest category switching from KMT to independent with 257 cases.
Both the NP and PFP also suffered from significant losses to inde-
pendents over their time as relevant parties. Though we see DPP-to-
independent coming in as the second largest category, the rate of
DPP politicians both standing as independents and switching parties
is far lower than that of the Blue parties. The numbers switching
back from independents to the main parties is also significant, but
again it is particularly common for the KMT and its splinter parties.
As for inswitching, or party-to-party switches, the key trend is that it
is far more prevalent between the KMT and its splinter parties
(Blues). The most common trends were KMT-PFP, PFP-KMT, NP-
PFP, KMT-NP, and NP-KMT. At the bottom end of the table there are
some cases of inswitching/start-up between the DPP and Green par-
ties, but the scale is far smaller than that seen in the Blue parties. In
fact, the only category coming in the top fifteen is DPP-TSU, with
sixteen such switches. One interesting finding is that although we
tend to think of the TSU as a Green party allied to the DPP, it actu-
ally attracted an almost equal number of defectors from the KMT as
it did from the DPP. 
Another trend apparent here is the rarity of switches across the
Blue-Green divide. The only major exception to this rule are the sev-
enteen switches from the KMT to the TSU early in the DPP era
(2000–2008). The sample I used found only four cases of switches
from the KMT to the DPP. The most famous of these was Chen
Ming-wen’s switch in 2001.10 In the reverse direction from Green to
Blue parties I only located one case of a switch from the TSU to the
KMT and one from the DPP to the KMT. Readers familiar with Tai-
wanese politics may be asking about the cases of Chu Kao-cheng and
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Cheng Li-wen. These two politicians did make the transfer from the
DPP to Blue parties, but did so via independent status or other parties
rather than directly. The first of these was Chu Kao-cheng, who was
first elected for the DPP but after standing as a DPP rebel in 1989
went on to form the SDP. He then merged the SDP into the NP in
1993 and stood twice as an NP candidate.11 The second case involved
the former KMT proportional representation legislator Cheng Li-
wen. She began her political career as a DPP National Assembly
member in 1996; however, by 2004 she was standing as an indepen-
dent in Kaohsiung and was elected as a KMT-nominated National
Assembly member in 2005.12 Of course there are some puzzling indi-
vidual cases, such as Hsu Chih-jen, who stood for the DPP in 1996
and then the NP in 1998 in Tainan County, or Huang Ta-ye, who
stood for the NP in 1997 and then the TSU in 2001 in Miaoli. These
cases are exceptional in that these politicians were moving from par-
ties at opposite ends of the national identity spectrum. 
With the data we have at hand we can now start to talk in terms
of a series of minor and major waves in party switching that can also
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Table 5  Most Common Types of Party Switching, 1986–2012
Rank Switch Type Number of Switches
1 KMT-I 257
2 DPP-I 96
3 I-KMT 77
4 KMT-PFP 44
5 I-DPP 43
6 I-PFP 34
7 PFP-KMT 27
8 NP-I 24
9 PFP-I 22
10 NP-PFP 21
11 I-TSU 19
12 KMT-NP 18
13 KMT-TSU 17
14 DPP-TSU 16
15 I-NP 13
16 NP-KMT 13
17 TSU-I 10
18 TSU-DPP 8
19 DPP-NNA 7
20 DPP-TIP 7
help to understand the key waves of party switching and develop-
ments in the party system. I have summarized the key trends in Table
6, which shows the most important patterns of switching in the eight
legislative terms. The vast majority of switches in the first two leg-
islative terms during the period of democratic transition were
outswitches from the KMT to stand as independents or KMT rebels.
The table suggests how severe the problem of KMT discipline was in
this period. In fact a number of the switches from KMT to indepen-
dents in 1992 were by key founding figures in the creation of the NP,
the first successful third party.13
During the first and second terms listed in Table 6 (1986–1989
and 1989–1992) a number of leftist parties emerged and nominated
significant numbers of candidates in national- and local-level elec-
tions. These parties do not feature prominently in Table 6 as the vast
majority of their candidates were getting their first taste of electoral
politics and did not come from existing parties. There were a very
small number of switches from the main parties to the leftist parties,
such as Chu, who went on to form the SDP after leaving the DPP;
Wang Yi-hsiung, who left the DPP to form the Labor Party; and
Chang Yi-bang, who switched from the KMT to the Labor Party. In
all these cases they were incumbent politicians who switched affilia-
tion during their terms. Chu and Chang still hold the record of being
the only leftist party politicians to be elected in Taiwan.14 That the
vast majority of leftist politicians came from nowhere clearly played
a major role in their electoral failures. In fact very few leftist party
politicians even attempted to stand again after their initial defeat. 
The first major pattern of inswitching between parties occurred
in the 1992–1995 legislative term. The key shift was from the KMT
to create the NP, a case of gradual start-up. In this term seven made
the shift from the KMT to the NP, with seven more in the 1995–1998
term. The SDP’s merger into the NP is also notable in the 1992–1995
term with five SDP politicians joining the NP. Thus party switching
played a key role in the creation of the new party. During the mid-
1990s the NP had a major impact on the party system, winning sig-
nificant Legislative Yuan, National Assembly, and City Council seats
with a rough parallel of 13 percent of the vote and seat shares at the
national level. The fact that it was recruiting established politicians
in large numbers explains why it had a far greater impact on the Tai-
wanese party system than the leftist parties that emerged earlier on
the scene in the democratic transition period. 
The switching patterns in the next legislative term (1995–1998)
suggest tensions within all three main parties. Table 6 shows some
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continuity in that there are still some switches from the KMT to NP;
however, the majority of these switches from the KMT to the NP oc-
curred in the first election (1996 National Assembly) in this term,
after which such switches started to dry up. The large number of
switches from the NP to independents also suggests that the NP was
in crisis. Thus we can see why the 1998 election is viewed as the start
of the decline of the NP. As usual there were KMT-to-independent
switches (fifty-two). However, the most common switch pattern be-
tween parties in this period was from the DPP to more radical Tai-
wanese nationalist parties, the TIP and NNA, with a total of fourteen
such cases. Nevertheless, the impact of this wave was lower than that
of the NP, as out of these fourteen cases only two were successfully
elected: Lee Ching-hsiung standing for the TIP in Kaohsiung and
Hsu Tian-tsai for the NNA in Tainan City in 1998. The fact that there
were two rival Green splinter parties both vying for votes and re-
cruiting politicians also contributed to their short shelf life. 
As we see in Table 6, the next legislative term saw the highest
number of party switches, particularly in 2001. These switches con-
tributed to the much more complex party scene of the early DPP era.
The most common switches were toward the new PFP with thirty-
seven joining from the KMT, fifteen from the NP, and another
twenty-five from independents. By the 2001 election the NP had al-
most ceased to exist as the PFP poached many of its most electable
candidates. When I interviewed the NP chairwoman Hsieh Chi-ta in
2001 she complained bitterly about how the PFP was enticing NP
politicians to change sides.15 In 2000–2001 the PFP clearly was an at-
tractive venue for ambitious politicians. Voters were also impressed,
as it gained 20 percent of legislative seats in its first major election.
Thus it performed better than the NP at its height and seemed to be
threatening the KMT’s status as the largest Blue party. The other
start-up party to emerge at this point was the Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU). As mentioned earlier, this party relied largely on re-
cruiting politicians from both the KMT and the DPP. 
There was more stability in the next legislative term (2001–
2004). Instead of party-to-party transfers, switches from the KMT,
DPP, and PFP to independents top the listing. Moreover, it appears
that the momentum toward the PFP had slowed down. The most sig-
nificant party-to-party switches were from the DPP to the TSU
(eight). One notable trend was from the NP to the KMT, with five
moving in this direction. In fact this was the largest party-to-party
switch toward the KMT in my dataset to date. This move was part of
a deal in which a group of NP politicians (re)joined the KMT and
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gained official KMT nomination and campaign support.16 These
switches meant that the NP appeared to have effectively merged back
into being a KMT faction. It is quite ironic that eleven years earlier it
was the NP that was absorbing the SDP. 
The revival of the KMT into Taiwan’s leading party accelerated
into the next legislative term (2004–2008) as nineteen PFP, four NP,
and fifteen independents switched to the KMT in the run-up to the
2008 presidential and legislative elections. These transfers meant that
even before the election it had already regained its status as the
largest party in Legislative Yuan. The KMT and PFP made an
arrangement similar to that between the KMT and the NP in 2004,
which allowed PFP politicians to stand as KMT candidates. These
transfers effectively meant that the PFP had, like the NP four years
earlier, become almost a KMT faction. The low number of KMT
switches to independents also suggests the attractiveness of the party.
Therefore the trend of party switches in this term contributed signif-
icantly to the return of two-party competition and the virtual elimina-
tion of all the third parties in the 2008 legislative election.17
In the final term (2008–2012) there appears to be a continuation
of trends from the seventh term. In other words, politicians continued
to defect from the PFP, NP, and independents toward the KMT,
though at a lower level than before. Similarly, politicians continued
to defect from the TSU to the DPP. Both these trends reinforced the
trend toward a two-party system. The one countertrend was the num-
ber of switches from independent to PFP in this term. This was part
of the PFP’s attempt to regain its status as a relevant party in 2012.
At the time of writing it is uncertain what kind of switching trends to
expect for the current term (2012–2016). It is quite possible that
there will also be low numbers of switches in the near future as there
are few electable politicians left in the smaller parties and electoral
space for third parties, at least at the district level, appears lower than
ever.18 However, the 2014 local elections offer an opportunity for the
smaller parties to remain relevant. 
Serial Switchers
Another way we can consider the issue of party switching is to look
at the career record of long-term politicians who have multiple
switch records. I have termed these as serial switchers. The politician
with the reputation of Taiwan’s serial switcher is of course Chu Kao-
cheng, who was discussed earlier. However, in my database there
were eight politicians who, like Chu, had switched affiliations on
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four occasions. Two of these came from the top switching district of
Kinmen. Another politician with a similar record of switching is
Chu’s former fellow partisan Yao Li-ming. Having first been elected
as an NP legislator in 1995 in Kaohsiung County, Yao then stood as
an independent (or NP rebel) in 1998 in Kaohsiung City. After a
decade away from electoral politics, in 2008 he was on the party list
for the Home Party (hongdang), which had emerged out of the anti-
corruption Red Shirts social movement of 2006. Next, in 2009 he
stood officially as an independent but was jointly recommended by
the Home Party and the NP in a legislative by-election in early 2009.
Most recently he was named on the party list of the Taiwan National
Congress. Although only featuring three switches, a more representa-
tive case is Lee Ching-hua, who started off as a KMT legislator
elected in 1992, but within less than a year became a founding mem-
ber of the NP in 1993. In 2000 he suddenly resigned as NP chairper-
son and joined the presidential campaign team of KMT rebel Soong
Chu-yu that became the basis for the foundation of the PFP; he soon
became a founding member of this party. Later when the PFP was on
the decline he became part of the wave of defections from the PFP
back to the KMT in the run-up to the 2008 elections. This is a com-
mon pattern in which KMT splinter party politicians eventually re-
turn to their original party. 
Such patterns are far less common in the DPP, where standing as
a rebel or switching to Green splinter parties is less easily forgiven.
In my sample there were in fact only a handful of cases of DPP
politicians who left to stand for another party and were allowed to re-
turn to the party. One such case was Chen Kuang-fu, who began his
career as a Tangwai (1985), then DPP Kaohsiung city councillor, and
then legislator in Kaohsiung. However, in 1998 he stood unsuccess-
fully for the TIP in the legislative elections. As the TIP fell into de-
cline he returned to his original home of Penghu County, where he
stood for the DPP on three occasions in local executive and legisla-
tive contests. A more successful but exceptional case was Hsu Tian-
tsai. Having won election as a legislator for the DPP in Tainan City
in 1992, he was not renominated in 1995 and instead ran successfully
as an independent. In 1998 he was reelected as a legislator for the
NNA. His final switch came in 2001 when the incumbent DPP
Tainan City mayor was embroiled in a corruption case. To resolve the
problem the DPP allowed Hsu to return as its official candidate.
Since then Hsu has remained in the DPP and won four successive
elections. 
46 Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Consequences of Taiwan’s Trends in Party Switching
for the Party System
Having discussed in some detail the key patterns of party switching
since the 1980s we can review some of the main consequences these
patterns have had for party politics in Taiwan. 
First, despite the moderate levels of party switching, these moves
have not resulted in a chaotic party system. Instead there has been a
clear logic to the patterns revealed in this study. The trends in party
switching have thus contributed to the overall stability of the system.
For example, the numbers of switches between the two main political
camps have been negligible. Although there have been a large num-
ber of switches among the Blue parties, these again have not resulted
in a transformation in the party system. In other words, though nu-
merous KMT politicians switched to the splinter parties in the 1990s
and post-2000 period, the majority of these splinter party politicians
returned to the KMT between 2005 and 2010. 
I have found that the most common type of changed affiliation
has been outswitching from the relevant parties to independent. This
phenomenon of rebel party candidates has been damaging for all par-
ties, especially the KMT and its splinter parties. However, even here
this pattern has contributed to party system stability because there is
a large gap between those outswitching to independent and those
being allowed to inswitch back from independent to the main parties.
The DPP has long been the least willing party to allow former rebels
to return to the fold, but it appears that this has increasingly also
been the case with the KMT and other parties. In other words, there
has been a squeezing of the space for independents, which has also
served to enhance party system stability. 
Party switching has been far more serious for the KMT and its
allied parties than for the DPP. This has had important ramifications
for the party system. The high levels of KMT defections have meant
that there has been much more space for third parties to develop on
the Blue side of Taiwanese politics. Thus, for instance, the two
largest parties that have challenged the mainstream parties since the
late 1980s have both split off from the KMT (the NP and PFP). The
high numbers of switches from the KMT to independent and splinter
parties (NP, PFP, and even TSU) all served to undermine the KMT’s
electoral performance between 1992 and 2004. These defections
meant the KMT or Blue side of Taiwanese politics was crowded with
candidates who divided the Blue support base. The most obvious ex-
ample of this is the impact of the KMT rebel Soong Chu-yu on the
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2000 presidential election and how his PFP further divided the Blue
votes in the period from 2001 to 2004. What made party defections
especially damaging for the KMT was that many of those defecting
were experienced politicians with strong support bases. Thus defec-
tions served to undermine the KMT’s human resources, at least until
2002. If the KMT had suffered a lower level of splinter party defec-
tions, it is likely it would have preserved its dominant party status
longer. 
After 2004 though, defections were to play a key role in the
KMT’s return to its status as by far the strongest party in Taiwan and
thus to its landslide victories in 2008. The wave of defections from
2004 from the NP, PFP, and independents back to the KMT con-
tributed to the return of a two-party system. Equally important was
the way these switches served to unite the Pan Blue camp behind the
KMT with a significant impact on the KMT’s electoral performance. 
In contrast, party defections have been far less severe for the
DPP. Politicians have been less willing to stand as DPP rebels, know-
ing the chances of being elected or returning to the DPP are lower.
Similarly, the DPP has suffered less than the KMT in defections to
splinter parties. Looking at the cases of the TIP, NNA, and TSU, all
illustrate this limited impact. Although the appearance of the NNA
and TIP had an irritant effect on the DPP in 1998, it was far less than
the effect of splinters on the KMT in 1995 or 2001. The key differ-
ence was that the DPP splinters failed to attract strong candidates to
defect. The pattern was similar with the TSU in the early DPP era. As
mentioned earlier the TSU recruited from both the KMT and the
DPP. However, it was only able to recruit second-string DPP politi-
cians who had no chance of nomination. In contrast, its ex-KMT
politicians such as Hsu Deng-gong had more electoral support and
experience. In short, patterns of party switching were highly benefi-
cial to the electoral performance of the DPP and its development as a
true competitor for national power. 
A final area where we can see the impact of defections has been
on what I have termed third parties. These are new parties that are
not splinters from the KMT or DPP but base their party image on a
different set of ideological appeals other than national identity. The
clear pattern with candidates representing these parties is that with a
small number of exceptions they came from nowhere. In other words,
their candidates did not have prior experience in the mainstream par-
ties or even as independents. Without an electoral support base these
parties have a severe human resource deficit and thus have been at a
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disadvantage when it came to elections. Thus, for instance, the only
successful third party candidates were the exceptions to the rule such
as Chu Kao-cheng (SDP) and Chang Yi-bang (LP), both of whom
had been originally elected for mainstream parties.19 This contributed
to their struggle to make an impact on the electoral scene. 
Conclusion
The topic of party switching has been neglected in Taiwan’s political
science. This study is the first comprehensive examination of Tai-
wan’s party-switching patterns since the arrival of the first genuine
opposition party in 1986. I have offered a picture of overall levels of
partisan switching and variation according to political party and geo-
graphical location. I have also revealed the most common types of
party switching and how party switching has changed over time. De-
spite the maturing of party politics and the institutionalization of the
party system, party switching levels have actually risen since 2000
and even today remain high. 
Despite the stability of Taiwan’s party system, there have been
significant numbers of party switchers. In fact the levels of party
switching found in this study are quite high compared to most estab-
lished democracies, though party switching has not been as chaotic
and confusing as that seen in South Korea or Japan. I argue the pat-
terns of party switching have actually contributed to the stability of
Taiwan’s party system. This stands in stark contrast to developments
in Japan, where party switching contributed to the virtual disappear-
ance of the largest opposition party, the Japanese Socialist Party, in
the 1990s. In contrast, party-switching patterns served to strengthen
the largest Taiwanese opposition party. Although switching has been
more common among Blue parties, there has been an inherent logic
to the patterns observed. Thus a large proportion of those who de-
fected from the KMT to splinter parties have over time returned to
their original party. Cases of party switching across the Green-Blue
divide have been extremely rare. Another major difference between
the two countries is that politicians from the KMT who defected have
been far more likely than Japan’s LDP defectors to return to the fold,
which, again, has had a stabilizing effect. 
This study of party switching also should be of interest to the
broader field of party-switching studies. I present an extremely rich
empirical examination of party-switching patterns that should offer
the scope for comparative analysis. I have applied a slightly different
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method of tracking party affiliation from other works in that I also
brought in candidate party status at levels of election other than na-
tional legislative contests. This has been more sensitive to picking up
party switching, which is critically important in countries where
politicians switch between different levels of elections. 
Naturally this article has its limitations and reveals the scope for
future research. For instance, it will be important to delve into the
motivations for politicians to switch affiliations over time, which will
require extensive fieldwork and examination of contemporary ac-
counts of switching. Nevertheless, the patterns of party switching
displayed in this study suggest a number of key explanatory variables
to be tested. For example, it appears that party culture, party popular-
ity, changes in party leadership, party policy positions, and nomina-
tion systems are all likely to be motivating forces behind decisions to
switch affiliations. In the field of the consequences of switching it
will be interesting to see whether switchers in Taiwan pay an elec-
toral price for defection, as has been the case in the United States. If
voters do punish switchers then why do politicians take the risk? A
final element of the switching process that deserves attention are
cases in which politicians switch electoral districts—a phenomenon
noted in my database and one not yet touched upon in the broader
party-switching literature. 
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1. Whether we should call 1986 the first multiparty election is a contro-
versial question. In 1986 the DPP challenged the KMT for the first time.
However, at the time Taiwan was still under martial law, it was a one-party
state, and the DPP was technically an illegal organization. On paper, there
were other political parties under martial law, but these were known as
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flower vase parties, as they were essentially just KMT satellite parties de-
signed to give the pretense of a multiparty system. 
2. This practice of open nomination was especially common in the dem-
ocratic transition period and still occurs occasionally in the case of the KMT
where it is unable to settle on one candidate in a single-member district and
allows for free competition between two KMT politicians. It is most com-
mon in very safe KMT seats such as Miaoli where the DPP stands little
chance even if confronted by a divided KMT. Moreover, open nomination is
listed as officially nominated in the Central Election Commission database. 
3. The term Tangwai (meaning outside the party) refers to opposition
politicians standing for election who were not KMT members during the
one-party state era. 
4. It should be noted that I only included cases where politicians stood
for at least one relevant party. Thus politicians who only ever stood as inde-
pendents were excluded from the analysis. 
5. I have also located affiliation and switching cases in a number of
other years in which by-elections were held. 
6. The terms Blue and Green camps became popular in the post-2000 pe-
riod. Blue is used for the KMT and its allies as this is the main color in the
KMT’s party flag. Similarly Green is the main color in the DPP’s party 
flag. 
7. Due to the limited number of cases, I combined Kinmen and Lienchi-
ang into one category. 
8. In 2005 Taiwan approved constitutional revisions that replaced the
Legislative Yuan’s old multiple-member district single nontransferable vote
electoral system with one consisting of seventy-three single-member dis-
tricts, six aboriginal seats, and thirty-four party list seats. Voters have two
votes, with one for the district candidate and the second for their party pref-
erence. The party list votes are then distributed proportionally to parties
gaining at least 5 percent of the vote. 
9. This paragraph is based on a comparison with data in Heller and
Mershon (2009), “Introduction,” Table 1.2, 11. 
10. At the time Chen was a KMT legislator but defected to the DPP to be
nominated as its candidate for the Chiayi County magistrate. 
11. He was later expelled by the NP and then stood twice unsuccessfully
as an independent. 
12. Some readers familiar with the Taiwan case may well be shouting out,
“Why did you not include Su Ying-kui or Lee Yung-ping?” Again, both
started out as DPP politicians and later joined the KMT and/or the PFP.
However, neither stood as a DPP candidate, so neither was picked up in the
database search. 
13. The best examples were Wang Chien-hsuan and Jaw Shaw-kong. 
14. Chu was elected for the SDP in 1992 and Chang won election for
the Labor Party in Kaohsiung City Council in 1989. Wang Yi-hsiung failed
in his bid for reelection under the Labor Party banner in 1989. 
15. Interview, Kaohsiung, August 2001. 
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16. In reality the KMT was quite selective in terms of which of these
NP recruits it actively supported. For example, Lu Li-kang received little
help from the Kaohsiung KMT party branch. 
17. The only third-party candidate elected in 2008 was a PFP candidate
in an aboriginal district, though he later had his legislator’s status canceled
due to a vote-buying case halfway through his term. 
18. I appreciate that this point could be challenged in light of the lim-
ited revival of both the TSU and PFP in the 2012 legislative elections. How-
ever, they were almost all elected under the proportional representation party
list rather than in regular districts. 
19. Another such case is Kao Meng-ting, who though elected for the GP in
1996 in Yunlin already had a strong support base and close links to political so-
ciety. In fact he was expelled from the GP just a year after being elected. 
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